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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we formulate and analyze a manufacturer-retailer supply chain model with product remanufacturing. 
This model takes into account both forward flow of the new product as well as reverse flow of the used product. 
Specifically, we assume that the manufacturer can control the wholesale price of the new product as well the 
transfer price of the used product from the retailer while the retailer can control the retail price of the new product 
and the collecting price of the used product. Under this assumption, we compare and contrast the coordinated 
scenario vs. the uncoordinated scenario. Managerial insights and a numerical example are illustrated.  
 
Keywords: Remanufacturing, Coordination, Pricing. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we study a single manufacturer- single retailer supply chain model with forward flow of the new 
product and reverse flow of the used product for remanufacturing. We will assume that the manufacturer can 
control the wholesale price of new product as well the transfer price of used product from the retailer; while the 
retailer can control the retail price of new product and the collecting price of used product. Under this assumption, 
this paper integrates a linear approximation of the product return rate function into the pricing decision of the 
supply chain members. 
 
Many extant remanufacturing literatures assume that the used products are returned at a predetermined rate, for 
example, in Toktay et al. (2000), a used camera is returned with probability p, independently of all other cameras. 
In these models, product returns are assumed to be an exogenous process and the remanufacturer passively 
accepts product returns.  
 
On the other hand, a few literatures address the problem of how to actively control the product returns using 
financial incentives. “In a market-driven system, end-users are motivated to return end-of-life products by 
financial incentives, such as deposit systems, credit toward a new unit, or cash paid for a specified level of 
quantity.” (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2001). In Savaskan et al. (2004), to achieve the return rate t , the 
collecting party must pay a total collecting cost )(   2 pDACL tt + , where 2 tLC  is a concave investment cost, A 
is variable collecting cost per unit and D(p) is the demand; the collector then can optimize over t  to maximize 
the profit. 
 
In our paper, we model the market-driven behavior of used product returns in the framework of pricing decision 
of the manufacturer-retailer supply chain. The key contribution of our model is the integration of a linear 
approximation of the product return rate function and the pricing decision of the retailer and the manufacturer 
under uncoordinated and coordinated scenarios. In our model, the optimal prices and the optimal return rates are 
 simultaneously determined. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate the supply chain model with a linear 
approximation of the return rate function. Then in Section 3 we solve the supply chain model and provide model 
analysis. Section 4 provides a numerical example. Finally, conclusion and future work are discussed in Section 5. 
Various interesting findings are presented throughout the paper. 
 
2. The supply chain model 
2.1 Model environment 
We consider a manufacturer-retailer model with product remanufacturing (see figure 1). The manufacturer can 
manufacture a new product from raw materials with unit cost of cm, or remanufacture a returned product into a 
new one with unit cost of cr. We assume there is no difference between the manufactured and remanufactured 
products (this is true for some products, e.g. photocopiers, see Kerr, 2000), and 0>-=D crcm . We also assume 
that the supply chain is manufacturer-driven, with manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader (see Ertek and Griffin, 
2002), i.e., the manufacturer can control the unit wholesale price of new products (w) and the unit transfer price 
of returned products from the retailer (b); while the retailer can control the unit retail price of new products (p) 
and the unit collecting price of returned products from end-customers (c). 
  
While there are many forms of demand function (see e.g. Gallego and Van Ryzin, 1994), the demand of new 
products in our paper is assumed to be a linear function of retail price p, i.e., ppD ´-= ba)( . The reverse flow 
is characterized by the return rate of used products, )(cr , which we assume is a linear function of the collecting 
price c. Specifically, )(cr  has the form: }1,min{)( kccr =  in which k  is the marginal return rate, i.e., one unit 
increase in c will result in k  unit increase of the product return rate. k  reflects the end-customers’ tendency toward 
product returning. )(cr  is bounded above by 1, when all the used products are returned to the supply chain. 1/k is 
the upper bound of retailer’s collecting price, because any collecting price larger than 1/k  would not improve the 
return rate any more. The linear function of )(cr  in our model is a first-degree approximation of many actual 
return rate functions (See Figure 2).  
 
We also have the following assumptions in our model: (1) all returned products are equal in quality and can be 
used for remanufacturing; (2) both the manufacturer and the retailer have access to the whole supply chain 
structure and cost information; (3) the model is considered in an equilibrium setting, i.e., transitional stages to the 
equilibrium of the manufactured and remanufactured products are not considered in this paper. 
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 2.2 Model formulation 
We first consider the profit of each member and the whole supply chain. The retailer’s profit, given wholesale 
price w and transfer price b, is 
 
(1) 
 
The retailer’s profit contains two parts: one is the profit from selling a new product; the other is the profit from 
collecting a used product and transferring it to the manufacturer. Accordingly, the manufacturer’s profit is  
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     (2) 
Due to remanufacturing, the average unit production cost of the manufacturer is )())(1( crcrcrcm ´+-´ , i.e., 
)(cr  of total new products will be from remanufactured, and the remaining )(1 cr-  will be manufactured from 
raw materials. The second term in MP  reflects the cost of transferring the used products from the retailer to the 
manufacturer. Finally, the total supply chain profit is   
)]()([)( crccmppMRT ´-D+-´´-=P+P=P ba      (3) 
We consider two scenarios for this supply chain model:  
Scenario 1: uncoordinated supply chain 
In the uncoordinated supply chain scenario, the manufacturer and the retailer optimize respectively their own 
profits by manipulating the variables under their own control. As stated above, we assume that the manufacturer 
has sufficient power and acts as a Stackelberg leader. Specifically, the retailer will maximize RP  over p, c for a 
given pair of w and b. Because of the information sharing assumption, the manufacturer will know exactly the 
retailer’s optimal retailer price ),(* bwp  and optimal collecting price ),(* bwc  (reactive functions). By taking 
into account these reactive functions, the manufacturer will maximize MP  over w and b. 
 
Scenario 2: coordinated supply chain 
In the coordinated supply chain scenario, the manufacturer and the retailer jointly determine the optimal prices 
( *p and *c ) to maximize overall supply chain profit TP . 
 
3. Model solution and analysis 
In this section, we first explain briefly the solution procedures for the two scenarios in subsection 3.1 and 3.2. 
Then we summarize the solution and provide analysis in subsection 3.3.  
 
3.1 Solution procedure for uncoordinated scenario 
In the uncoordinated scenario, we first assume that the optimal kc /1* £ . By setting  
0=P
¶
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c
 and 0=P
¶
¶ R
p
 
we can get 2/* bc =  and 2/8/)2/( 2* wkbp +-= ba  ( RP  is jointly concave in p and c). By replacing c and p 
in MP with *c and *p , we can get 16/)44)(2)2 ()(( 2 bba wkbwkbcmkcrbbM -++-++-=P , which is a 
polynomial of w and b. By setting  
0=P
¶
¶ M
w  and 
0=P
¶
¶ M
b   
and solving the equations simultaneously, we get three solutions ( 8/2/)2/( 21 D++= kcmw ba , D=1b ), ( 2w , 2b ) 
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 and ( 3w , 3b ). However 0),( 22 =P bwM  and 0),( 33 =P bwM ; and ( 1w , 1b ) is the only solution that 0>P M . 
By checking the Hessian matrix of MP  with respect to w and b at ( 1w , 1b ), we find that ( 1w , 1b ) would be a 
global optimal solution if 0)4/( 2 >D-- ba kcm . This condition is always satisfied because when D== 1bb  
and 2/2/* D== bc , the total profit of the supply chain is 
)4/)(()]()([)( 2D+-´-=´-D+-´´-=P kcmppcrccmppT baba . For 0>PT , the conditions that 
pkcm <D-£ 4/0 2  and 0>´- pba  are true for all feasible p’s, which leads to 0)4/( 2 >D-- ba kcm . 
Because 0³PT  is the least requirement for the supply chain, the condition 0)4/( 2 >D-- ba kcm  is always 
true. Thus ( 8/2/)2/( 2* D++= kcmw ba , D=*b ) is the optimal solution when kc /1* <  or k/12/ £D . We can 
also find *p , *MP , *RP  and *TP  by replacing b and w with *b  and *w in appropriate formulas. 
When k/12/ >D , the optimal solution is obtained at kc /1* = . Using similar procedures as above, we can get 
corresponding *p , *w , *b , *MP , *RP  and *TP  for the case of k/12/ >D . The ultimate solution is a 
combination of the two solutions of k/12/ £D  and k/12/ >D  (i.e., a minimum of the two solutions, except 
retailer price *p  which is a maximum of the two, see Table 1).  
 
3.2 Solution procedure for coordinated scenario 
In the coordinated scenario, we first assume that the optimal kc /1* £ . By maximizing TP  over p and c, we can 
get 2/* D=c  and 8/2/)2/( 2* D-+= kcmp ba  ( TP  is jointly concave in p and c). We then can get *TP  by 
replacing p  and c with *p  and *c . When kc /1* > , the optimal solution is obtained at kc /1* = . Using similar 
procedures as above, we can get corresponding *p  and *TP . The ultimate solution is a combination of the two 
solutions of k/12/ £D  and k/12/ >D  (i.e., a minimum of the two solutions, except retailer price *p  which is 
a maximum of the two, see Table 1). 
 
3.3 Solution analysis 
The solution of the supply chain model is listed in the Table 1.  
Table 1. Solution of the supply chain model 
 Scenario 1 (Uncoordinated) Scenario 2 (Coordinated) 
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 * 0³e  and the same e  for *w  and *b . In calculating min{×,×}, set 0=e .  
 
From Table 1, we can notice that depending on k/12/ >D  or k/12/ <D , the optimal solution is drawn from one 
set of two solutions. An interesting observation is that when k/12/ >D , the optimal whole price is 
eba +++= )2/(32/)2/(* kcrw  and optimal transfer price is e+= kb /2*  ( 0³e , and e is same for *w  and 
*b ). This is because when k/12/ >D , the retailer will set the collecting price to kc /1* =  and thus the product 
return rate 1)( * =cr , i.e., every new product sold will be returned eventually. Therefore, only the difference of w  
and b affects the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in our model.  
 
As to the profit, we notice that in the uncoordinated scenario *RP , *MP  and *TP  have linear relationships 
( 3/ 2 2 *T** P=P=P RM ). Also we can derive that the upper bound of *RP  is )16/()( 2 bba ´- cr  when ¥=k ; 
while the lower bound of *RP  is )16/()( 2 bba ´- cm  when 0=k  (Similar for *MP  and *TP ).  
 
Finally, we can find the relationship between the uncoordinated scenario and the coordinated scenario. The 
collecting price *c is the same in both scenarios; while the retailer price has the relationship ba /2 ** += cu pp  
( *up  is the optimal retailer price in uncoordinated case, *cp  is the optimal retailer price in coordinated case). 
Also the total profit of the uncoordinated scenario is only 75% of that of the coordinated scenario.  
 
4. Numerical example 
In this section, we use a numerical example to illustrate the supply chain model. As we stated before, the marginal 
return rate k  reflects the end-customers’ tendency towards product returning and plays an important role in our 
model, we will therefore particularly focus on how k  affects the performances of the supply chain in this 
numerical example. 
 
The parameters used in the numerical example are 1000=a , 20=b , cm=10, and cr=8; we also vary the 
parameter k  from 0 to 2 to demonstrate its effect. The performance of the supply chain is sketched in Figure 3. 
The graphs in the upper row are of the uncoordinated scenario; the graphs in the lower row are of the coordinated 
scenario. 
 
Figure 3. The supply chain performance (numerical example) 
We can notice that there are two phases in each graph: 1/2 =D£k  and 1/2 =D³k . For example, the wholesale 
price w first increases and then decreases; while the retailer price keeps decreasing all the way, but at different 
rate in the two phases. The manufacturer retains no direct savings from remanufacturing ( 2=-=D crcm ) in the 
 first phase, while starts to retain part of such direct savings in the second phase ( *b is starting to decrease). We 
can also see that the retailer price is lower and total supply chain profit is higher in the coordinated case than that 
in the uncoordinated case. 
 
5. Conclusions and future work 
In this paper, we analyzed a manufacturer-retailer supply chain model with product remanufacturing. A linear 
approximation of the product return rate function, based on the market-driven behavior of used product returns, 
was modeled and integrated into the pricing decision of the retailer and the manufacturer. Two scenarios, 
uncoordinated and coordinated supply chain, were solved and compared.  
 
Future research can extend our model in several ways. At the present time, we are investigating the cause and 
degree of “inefficiency” (profit loss due to the decentralized decision process of the uncoordinated scenario vs. 
the coordinated scenario) in the forward and reverse flow separately. We are also studying the case when the 
return rate function r(c) has a general form ( 1)(0 ££ cr , )(' cr exists and 0)(' >cr ) and its impact on the supply 
chain model, including the feasibility of various coordination mechanisms, such as fixed franchise fee, quantity 
discount, etc. Further extension can also consider using piecewise linear approximation of r(c) in our model.  
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